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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jon G. Pedersen, a

veteran, was sent to prison for drinking alcohol at his

home in violation of his probation. A licensed psychiatrist concluded Mr. Pedersen lacked
capacity to understand the proceedings against him and could not assist in his own defense.
Mr. Pedersen could not have coherent conversations; he could not consult with his attorney; he
could not provide reliable and accurate information. Mr. Pedersen has no place in prison. He
appeals from the district court’s order revoking his probation and executing his sentence, albeit
with a reduction. He contends the district court erred in proceeding with probation violation
proceedings against him in light of the uncontroverted evidence that he was unfit to proceed, as
this violated Idaho Code § 18-210 and his constitutional right to due process. He also contends
the district court erred in revoking his probation based on its finding that he willfully violated the
terms of his probation by drinking alcohol, in the absence of any evidence he knew he was not
permitted to drink alcohol.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Pedersen was born in New York

. (Presentence Investigation Report

(“PSI”), p.6.) He was drafted in the military in 1966 after completing one year of community
college, and served in active duty and in the reserves. (PSI, pp.7-8.) After he was honorably
discharged, Mr. Pedersen embarked on a 25-year career in industrial drafting and technical
illustrating. (PSI, p.8; Psych. Eval., p.3.) He then worked as a janitor for the Blaine County
School District for 12 years before retiring in 2009. (PSI, p.8.) Mr. Pedersen began drinking
alcohol as a teenager, and has struggled with his drinking ever since. (Psych. Eval., p.4.)
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In 2013, Mr. Pedersen was convicted of felony driving under the influence of alcohol,
and was sentenced to ten years fixed. (R., pp.43-49.) After he successfully completed a rider, the
district court suspended Mr. Pedersen’s sentence and placed him on probation for ten years.
(R., pp.53-63.) In 2016, the Idaho Board of Correction filed a request for Mr. Pedersen to be
discharged from probation, stating he had done well on probation and had successfully
completed substance abuse treatment. (R., pp.68-70.) The district court denied the request.
(R., pp.76-79.)
In September 2016, the State filed a motion to revoke Mr. Pedersen’s probation.
(R., pp.81-88.) Mr. Pedersen’s probation officer said she had asked Mr. Pedersen to come to her
office to discuss his continued use of alcohol. (R., p.84.) Mr. Pedersen “seemed confused” and
the probation officer had to explain where the office was located. (Id.) When he got to the office,
Mr. Pedersen told his probation officer he had been having trouble remembering things. (Id.)
Mr. Pedersen phoned his probation officer to say he forgot about the scheduled appointment and
was having memory problems. (Id.) Mr. Pedersen admitted drinking alcohol, and the district
court accepted his admission, and ultimately reinstated him on probation. (R., pp.98-99, 113-17.)
On April 25, 2018, Mr. Pedersen’s new probation officer visited Mr. Pedersen at his
home, and Mr. Pedersen admitted drinking alcohol, and had a breath alcohol content of
.123/.115. (R., pp.120-24.) The State filed a motion to revoke Mr. Pedersen’s probation, alleging
Mr. Pedersen violated probation by drinking alcohol. (Id.) The State filed an amended motion
alleging Mr. Pedersen also violated probation by failing to report for alcohol testing. (R., pp.13444.) Counsel for Mr. Pedersen filed a motion for a competency evaluation pursuant to Idaho
Code §§ 18-210, 18-211, and 18-212. (R., pp.145-46.) The district court granted the motion, and
ordered an evaluation. (R., pp.147-49.)
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Dr. Nels M. Sather, a licensed psychologist, evaluated Mr. Pedersen in June 2018.
(Psych. Eval., p.2.) In his report, Dr. Sather said Mr. Pedersen “seemed cognitively confused
throughout the evaluation.” (Psych. Eval., p.5.) He assessed Mr. Pedersen as having “severe
cognitive impairment when dealing with complexity.” (Psych. Eval., p.7.) With respect to
Mr. Pedersen’s fitness to proceed, Dr. Sather noted the following:
•

Mr. Pedersen can’t remember his attorney’s name but . . . has it written
down on a piece of paper.

•

He doesn’t know if he can understand what his attorney says to him
because he can’t remember talking to him.

•

He could not state his legal rights, and stated that the defendant in his case
is “the State of Idaho.”

•

He becomes confused and cannot provide reliable and accurate
information.

•

He is not capable of testifying if necessary.

•

He cannot reasonably process information relevant to decision-making.

(Psych. Eval., p.8.) Dr. Sather concluded Mr. Pedersen “is unfit to proceed” and “is not likely to
become fit to proceed in the future” due to a progressive neurocognitive disorder. (Psych. Eval.,
p.9.)
At the evidentiary hearing, the district court noted it had reviewed Dr. Sather’s report.
(Tr., p.4, Ls.17-20.) Before hearing from counsel, the district court said the report “does not
impair the ability to proceed on the State’s motion to revoke” but “would preclude the Court
from taking admissions . . . .” (Tr., p.4, L.21 – p.5, L.2.) Counsel for Mr. Pedersen argued it was
not appropriate to go forward because “competency is a due process issue.” (Tr., p.5, Ls.3-8.)
The district court concluded otherwise, stating, “Well, an 18-211 says that a person can be tried,
convicted, sentenced, or punished for the commission of an offense. That has all previously been
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taken care of prior to his incompetency.” (Tr., p.5, Ls.9-13.) Counsel acknowledged there was no
case law on point in Idaho, but argued the due process requirement of competency should apply
to probation violation proceedings. (Tr., p.5, Ls.14-24.) Counsel said he had not been able to
have “any sort of meaningful conversation with [Mr. Pedersen]” and was not sure he could
challenge willfulness in the absence of such a conversation. (Tr., p.6, Ls.1-14.) The prosecutor
told the court the State was “prepared to go forward.” (Tr., p.6, L.24 – p.7, L.1.) Counsel for
Mr. Pedersen said, “If we go forward, I would simply state that it’s over my objection, and I’ll
proceed after that fact.” (Tr., p.8, Ls.2-4.) The district court went forward. (Tr., p.8, Ls.5-8.)
Mr. Pedersen’s probation officer testified, among other things, that he visited
Mr. Pedersen at his residence, and Mr. Pedersen tested positive for alcohol. (Tr., p.12, Ls.2-10.)
On cross-examination, counsel for Mr. Pedersen asked the probation officer if he was aware of
Mr. Pedersen’s mental health problems. (Tr., p.14, Ls.6-7.) The probation officer answered:
I mean, in dealing with Jon, I can tell that he wasn’t all there. And then,
obviously, hearing, you know, the findings from the doctor that you told me, you
know, there’s obviously something there that he doesn’t appear able to retain
information and have coherent conversations.
(Tr., p.14, Ls.8-13.) Counsel for Mr. Pedersen argued the State did not prove a willful violation
because “I don’t know how we can say with any degree of certainty that Jon was aware, at any
given moment, what it was that he was supposed to be doing, what it was he wasn’t supposed to
be doing, or where it was he supposed to go.” (Tr., p.16, Ls.11-17.) The district court found
Mr. Pedersen “is aware that he is not to consume alcohol” and willfully violated probation by
drinking alcohol. (Tr., p.18, Ls.13-20.) The district court did not find Mr. Pedersen violated
probation by failing to submit to alcohol testing. (Tr., p.18, L.21 – p.19, L.9.)
At the disposition hearing, counsel for Mr. Pedersen renewed his objection to proceeding
based on Mr. Pedersen’s incompetence. (Tr., p.23, L.18 – p.24, L.7.) The district court overruled
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the objection. (Tr., p.24, Ls.8-13.) The prosecutor acknowledged that “keeping [Mr. Pedersen] in
custody presents certain problems, because he’s, frankly, not all there.” (Tr., p.25, Ls.11-13.)
The prosecutor said he did not know if it would be appropriate to execute Mr. Pedersen’s
underlying sentence. (Tr., p.25, Ls.13-18.) The prosecutor recommended Mr. Pedersen be
sentenced to two years in prison. (Tr., p.25, Ls.19-23.) Counsel for Mr. Pedersen argued it was
cruel and unusual for Mr. Pedersen to be imprisoned on account of his condition. (Tr., p.26,
Ls.1-4.) Counsel recommended Mr. Pedersen be sentenced to credit for time served, with the
remainder of his sentence commuted. (Tr., p.27, Ls.16-20.)
The district court revoked Mr. Pedersen’s probation, and executed his sentence, reducing
his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 from ten years fixed, to a unified term of six
years, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.29, Ls.11-16; R., pp.160-62.) Mr. Pedersen filed a timely
notice of appeal.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err in proceeding with probation violation proceedings against
Mr. Pedersen in light of the uncontroverted evidence that he lacked capacity to
understand the proceedings against him and assist in his own defense?

II.

Did the district court err in revoking Mr. Pedersen’s probation based on its finding that he
willfully violated the terms of his probation by drinking alcohol, in the absence of any
evidence he knew he was not permitted to drink alcohol?
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ARGUMENT
I.
In Light Of The Uncontroverted Evidence That Mr. Pedersen Lacked Capacity To Understand
The Proceedings Against Him And Assist In His Own Defense, The District Court Erred In
Proceeding With Probation Violation Proceedings
A.

Introduction
The district court presided over an evidentiary hearing and a disposition hearing and

ultimately revoked Mr. Pedersen’s probation over defense counsel’s repeated objection, despite
the uncontroverted evidence that Mr. Pedersen lacked capacity to understand the proceedings
against him and assist in his own defense. The district court erred in concluding probation
violation proceedings are not governed by Idaho Code § 18-210, as the revocation of probation
constitutes a punishment within the meaning of this statute. In addition, in proceeding with
probation violation proceedings against Mr. Pedersen notwithstanding his incompetence, the
district court violated Mr. Pedersen’s constitutional right to due process.

B.

Standard Of Review
“This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes.”

State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “When
interpreting a statute, the Court begins with an examination of the literal words of the statute.”
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory
construction.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The determination of whether
constitutional requirements have been satisfied in a probation revocation hearing is subject to
free review.” State v. White, 158 Idaho 827, 828 (Ct. App. 2015) (citations omitted).
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C.

A Person Cannot Be Subject To Probation Violation Proceedings When He Is
Determined To Be Incompetent Because The Revocation Of Probation Constitutes A
Punishment Within The Meaning Of Idaho Code § 18-210
Idaho Code § 18-210 states that “[n]o person who as a result of mental disease or defect

lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be
tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense so long as such
incapacity endures.” Here, Mr. Pedersen was determined by Dr. Sather to be incompetent within
the meaning of this statute. (Psych Eval., p.9.) The district court concluded, over defense
counsel’s objections, that it could proceed with probation violation proceedings against
Mr. Pedersen notwithstanding his incompetence because the statute did not apply. (Tr., p.8, Ls.28.) The court said, “Well, an 18-211 says that a person can be tried, convicted, sentenced, or
punished for the commission of an offense. That has all previously been taken care of prior to his
incompetency.” (Tr., p.5, Ls.9-13.) The district court erred in its interpretation of the statute.
Mr. Pedersen recognizes “[a] motion to revoke probation is not a criminal prosecution.”
White, 158 Idaho at 828-29 (citations omitted); see also Gagnon v. Scarpell, 411 U.S. 778, 782
(1973) (“Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution,
but does result in a loss of liberty.”) But section 18-210 does not apply only to criminal
prosecutions. Instead, it applies to any proceeding that can result in conviction, sentence, or
punishment. Here, the district court revoked Mr. Pedersen’s probation and executed his sentence.
(R., pp.160-62.) As a result, Mr. Pedersen was sent to prison. Being sent to prison is surely being
“punished for the commission of an offense” within the meaning of section 18-210.
In State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122 (2011), the Idaho Supreme Court described section 18210 as a “safeguard” that “make[s] it impossible for an incapacitated person to be sentenced to
prison.” Id. at 131. The Court explained that the statute “show[s] an acknowledgement that the
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truly mentally ill require treatment beyond that given to the average inmate.” Id. Under the
district court’s interpretation, section 18-210 did not act as a safeguard for Mr. Pedersen, and did
not prevent him from being sentenced to prison. The district court erred in its interpretation of
the statute. Section 18-210 applies to probation violation proceedings as those proceedings can
result in punishment for the commission of an offense.

D.

The District Court Violated Mr. Pedersen’s Constitutional Right To Due Process When It
Conducted Probation Violation Proceedings Against Him Notwithstanding His
Incompetence
By proceeding with probation violation proceedings against Mr. Pedersen despite his

incompetence, the district court violated Mr. Pedersen’s constitutional right to due process.
While “probationers do not enjoy the full panoply of constitutional protections afforded criminal
defendants . . . a probationer has a protected liberty in continuing probation and is therefore
entitled to due process before probation may be revoked.” White, 158 Idaho at 828-29 (citations
omitted). Among other protections, a probationer has a constitutional right under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the process set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 488-90 (1972) and Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782, 786. See State v. Scraggins, 153
Idaho 867, 871 (2012) (stating the Court looks to Morrissey and Gagnon for the minimum due
process requirements with regard to the revocation of probation). The minimum requirements of
due process include, among other things, “the opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence,” and “the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation).” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488-89.
It is undisputed that, prior to the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Pedersen was determined to be
“unfit to proceed” due to a progressive neurocognitive disorder. (Psych. Eval., p.9.) Dr. Sather
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evaluated Mr. Pedersen less than one month before the evidentiary hearing. He found
Mr. Pedersen could not remember his attorney’s name, could not remember talking to his
attorney, could not provide reliable and accurate information, was not capable of testifying, and
could not reasonably process information relevant to decision-making. (Psych. Eval., p.8.) In
light of Dr. Sather’s undisputed findings and conclusions, the district court’s decision to proceed
with probation violation proceedings violated Mr. Pedersen’s constitutional right to due process
as it rendered null his due process rights.
Under this same reasoning, other jurisdictions have found that due process requires that
probationers be competent at probation revocation hearings, and that proceeding with such
hearings when a probationer is not competent violates due process. See, e.g., People v.
Concepcion, 972 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. 2nd Dept. 2013) (holding due process requires an alleged
violation of probation may not be adjudicated while a defendant is incompetent); Hayes v.
State, 343 So.2d 672 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977) (holding trial court should not have denied defendant’s
request

for

competency

evaluation

during

probation

revocation

proceedings)

(per

curiam); State v. Davis, 468 N.E.2d 172, 181 (Ill. App. 1984) (finding conditional discharge
revocations are analogous to probation revocations and holding a defendant is entitled to a fitness
hearing prior to a revocation proceeding if his competency is questioned by the court or the
parties); Commonwealth v. Megella, 408 A.2d 483, 486 (Pa. Super. 1979) (finding revocation of
probation and subsequent re-sentencing of defendant who is mentally incapable of participating
in the proceeding is a violation of due process).
The Idaho Supreme Court has not yet considered the issue, but should follow the lead of
these courts and hold that a probationer who is found to be incompetent within the meaning of
section 18-210 cannot, consistent with due process, be subjected to probation revocation
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proceedings. As the Indiana Court of Appeals explained, “[w]ithout competency, the minimal
due process rights guaranteed to probationers at probation revocation hearings would be rendered
useless.” Donald v. State, 930 N.E.2d 76, 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). It is undisputed that
Mr. Pedersen was incompetent at the time the district court held probation revocation
proceedings. The district court violated Mr. Pedersen’s constitutional due process rights by
holding those proceedings when Mr. Pedersen could not meaningfully participate.

II.
The District Court Erred In Revoking Mr. Pedersen’s Probation Based On Its Finding That He
Willfully Violated The Terms Of His Probation By Drinking Alcohol, In The Absence Of Any
Evidence He Knew He Was Not Permitted To Drink Alcohol
A.

Introduction
The district court found Mr. Pedersen willfully violated the terms of his probation

because he drank alcohol and “is aware that he is not to consume alcohol.” (Tr., p.18, Ls.13-20.)
This finding was not supported by substantial evidence as there was no evidence presented at the
disposition hearing that, on April 25, 2018, when Mr. Pedersen allegedly violated probation by
drinking alcohol at his house, he was aware of any of the facts and circumstances surrounding
his probation. The district court thus erred in revoking Mr. Pedersen’s probation.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to revoke probation is a two-step process. Garner, 161 Idaho at 710. The

two steps are as follows:
First, a court may not revoke probation without a finding that the probationer
violated the terms of probation. The trial court’s factual findings in a probation
revocation proceeding, including a finding that a violation has been proven, will
be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. Second, once a probation
violation has been proven, the decision of whether to revoke probation is within
the sound discretion of the court.
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State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110 (2018) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).

C.

The District Court’s Finding That Mr. Pedersen Was Aware He Was Not To Consume
Alcohol On April 25, 2018 Is Not Supported By Substantial Evidence
A court may revoke probation only if the defendant admits, or the court finds, “that the

defendant willfully violated a condition of his probation.” I.C.R. 33; see also Garner, 161 Idaho
at 711 (recognizing “probation may only be revoked if the defendant’s violation was willful”).
Here, the State did not present substantial evidence that Mr. Pedersen was aware, on April 25,
2018, of any of the facts and circumstances surrounding his probation, including the fact that he
was not supposed to consume alcohol.
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Pedersen’s probation officer testified he visited
Mr. Pedersen at his residence on April 25, 2018. (Tr., p.12, Ls.2-6.) The probation officer said in
his affidavit that he asked Mr. Pedersen if he had been drinking alcohol, and he said yes.
(R., p.121.) At the hearing, the probation officer testified Mr. Pedersen tested positive for
alcohol. (Tr., p.12, Ls.7-10.) On cross-examination, counsel for Mr. Pedersen asked the
probation officer if he was aware of Mr. Pedersen’s mental health problems. (Tr., p.14, Ls.6-7.)
The probation officer answered:
I mean, in dealing with Jon, I can tell that he wasn’t all there. And then,
obviously, hearing, you know, the findings from the doctor that you told me, you
know, there’s obviously something there that he doesn’t appear able to retain
information and have coherent conversations.
(Tr., p.14, Ls.8-13.)
Counsel for Mr. Pedersen relied on Dr. Sather’s psychological evaluation of
Mr. Pedersen, which was made part of the record at the evidentiary hearing. (Tr., p.15, Ls.1619.) Dr. Sathers noted the following:
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•

Mr. Pedersen can’t remember his attorney’s name but . . . has it written
down on a piece of paper.

•

He doesn’t know if he can understand what his attorney says to him
because he can’t remember talking to him.

•

He could not state his legal rights, and stated that the defendant in his case
is “the State of Idaho.”

•

He becomes confused and cannot provide reliable and accurate
information.

•

He is not capable of testifying if necessary.

•

He cannot reasonably process information relevant to decision-making.

(Psych. Eval., p.8.) Dr. Sather concluded Mr. Pedersen “is unfit to proceed” and “is not likely to
become fit to proceed in the future” due to a progressive neurocognitive disorder. (Psych. Eval.,
p.9.)
Counsel for Mr. Pedersen argued the State did not present sufficient evidence that
Mr. Pedersen willfully violated his probation in light of Dr. Sather’s conclusions. He argued:
Your Honor, it is essential that a probation violation be proven that it was willful
and . . . I don’t know how we can say with any degree of certainty that Jon was
aware, at any given moment, what it was that he was supposed to be doing, what
it was he wasn’t supposed to be doing, or where it was he was supposed to go.
(Tr., p.16, Ls.10-17.) Counsel continued:
I don’t know that we necessarily dispute that [the probation officer] observed
what he did . . . but based upon the evidence that’s available to the Court with
regard to Jon’s condition and Jon’s deteriorating mental state, I don’t know that
there’s any way to come to a conclusion as whether or not his conduct was
willful.
(Tr., p.17, L.19 – p.18, L.1.) The prosecutor did not respond to these arguments. (Tr., p.18, Ls.24.)
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The district court found, based on nothing, that “the defendant is aware that he is not to
consume alcohol.” (Tr., p.18, Ls.14-17.) This finding was not supported by substantial evidence,
and cannot be upheld by this Court on appeal.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Pedersen respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
district court’s order revoking his probation and executing his sentence and remand this case to
the district court with instructions to place him back on probation.
DATED this 14th day of March, 2019.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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